Pope Francis, CIA and ‘Death Squads’
Global Research, March 18, 2013
In the 1970s, Father Jorge Bergoglio
faced a moment of truth: Would he stand up to Argentina’s military
neo-Nazis “disappearing” thousands including priests, or keep his mouth
shut and his career on track? Like many other Church leaders, Pope
Francis took the safe route, Robert Parry reports.
The election of Argentine Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio as Pope Francis
brings back into focus the troubling role of the Catholic hierarchy in
blessing much of the brutal repression that swept Latin America in the
1970s and 1980s, killing and torturing tens of thousands of people
including priests and nuns accused of sympathizing with leftists.
The Vatican’s fiercely defensive reaction to
the reemergence of these questions as they relate to the new Pope also
is reminiscent of the pattern of deceptive denials that became another
hallmark of that era when propaganda was viewed as an integral part of
the “anticommunist” struggles, which were often supported financially
and militarily by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Image: Pope John Paul II
reprimanding Father Ernesto Cardenal at Managua Airport for Cardenal’s
support of “liberation theology” and his work with the Sandinista
government.
It appears that Bergoglio, who was head of the Jesuit order in Buenos
Aires during Argentina’s grim “dirty war,” mostly tended to his
bureaucratic rise within the Church as Argentine security forces
“disappeared” some 30,000 people for torture and murder from 1976 to
1983, including 150 Catholic priests suspected of believing in
“liberation theology.”
Much as Pope Pius XII didn’t
directly challenge the Nazis during the Holocaust, Father Bergoglio
avoided any direct confrontation with the neo-Nazis who were terrorizing
Argentina. Pope Francis’s defenders today, like apologists for Pope
Pius, claim he did intervene quietly to save some individuals.
But no one asserts that Bergoglio stood up publicly against the
“anticommunist” terror, as some other Church leaders did in Latin
America, most notably El Salvador’s Archbishop Oscar Romero who then
became a victim of right-wing assassins in 1980.
Indeed, the predominant role of the Church hierarchy – from the
Vatican to the bishops in the individual countries – was to give
political cover to the slaughter and to offer little protection to the
priests and nuns who advocated “liberation theology,” i.e. the belief
that Jesus did not just favor charity to the poor but wanted a just society that shared wealth and power with the poor.
In Latin America with its calcified class structure of a few
oligarchs at one end and many peasants at the other, that meant reforms,
such as land redistribution, literacy programs, health clinics, union
rights, etc. But those changes were fiercely opposed by the local
oligarchs and the multinational corporations that profited from the
cheap labor and inequitable land distribution.
So, any reformers of any stripe were readily labeled “communists” and
were made the targets of vicious security forces, often trained and
indoctrinated by “anticommunist” military officers at the U.S.-run
School of the Americas. The primary role of the Catholic hierarchy was
to urge the people to stay calm and support the traditional system.
It is noteworthy that the orchestrated praise for Pope Francis in the
U.S. news media has been to hail Bergoglio’s supposedly “humble”
personality and his “commitment to the poor.” However, Bergoglio’s
approach fits with the Church’s attitude for centuries, to give
“charity” to the poor while doing little to change their cruel
circumstances – as Church grandees hobnob with the rich and powerful.
Another Pope Favorite
Pope John Paul II, another favorite of the U.S. news media, shared
this classic outlook. He emphasized conservative social issues, telling
the faithful to forgo contraceptives, treating women as second-class
Catholics and condemning homosexuality. He promoted charity for the poor
and sometimes criticized excesses of capitalism, but he disdained
leftist governments that sought serious economic reforms.
Elected in 1978, as right-wing “death squads” were gaining momentum
across Latin America, John Paul II offered little protection to
left-leaning priests and nuns who were targeted. He rebuffed Archbishop
Romero’s plea to condemn El Salvador’s right-wing regime and its human
rights violations. He stood by as priests were butchered and nuns were
raped and killed.
Instead of leading the charge for real economic and political change
in Latin America, John Paul II denounced “liberation theology.” During a
1983 trip to Nicaragua – then ruled by the leftist Sandinistas – the
Pope condemned what he called the “popular Church” and would not let
Ernesto Cardenal, a priest and a minister in the Sandinista government,
kiss the papal ring. He also elevated clerics like Bergoglio who didn’t
protest right-wing repression.
John Paul II appears to have gone even further, allowing the Catholic
Church in Nicaragua to be used by the CIA and Ronald Reagan’s
administration to finance and organize internal disruptions while the
violent Nicaraguan Contras terrorized northern Nicaraguan towns with
raids notorious for rape, torture and extrajudicial executions.
The Contras were originally organized by an Argentine intelligence
unit that emerged from the country’s domestic “dirty war” and was taking
its “anticommunist” crusade of terror across borders. After Reagan took
office in 1981, he authorized the CIA to join with Argentine
intelligence in expanding the Contras and their counterrevolutionary
war.
A key part of Reagan’s Contra strategy was to persuade the American
people and Congress that the Sandinistas represented a repressive
communist dictatorship that persecuted the Catholic Church, aimed to
create a “totalitarian dungeon,” and thus deserved violent overthrow.
A special office inside the National Security Council, headed by
longtime CIA disinformation specialist Walter Raymond Jr., pushed these
propaganda “themes” domestically. Raymond’s campaign exploited examples
of tensions between the Catholic hierarchy and the Sandinista government
as well as with La Prensa, the leading opposition newspaper.
To make the propaganda work with Americans, it was important to conceal the fact that elements of the Catholic hierarchy and La Prensa were
being financed by the CIA and were coordinating with the Reagan
administration’s destabilization strategies. [See Robert Parry’s Lost History.]
Evidence of Payments
In 1988, I discovered evidence of this reality while working as a
correspondent for Newsweek magazine. At the time, the Iran-Contra
scandal had undermined the case for spending more U.S. money to arm the
Contras. But the Reagan administration continued to beat the propaganda
drums by highlighting the supposed persecution of Nicaragua’s internal
opposition.
To fend off U.S. hostility, which also included a harsh economic
embargo, the Sandinistas announced increased political freedoms. But
that represented only a new opportunity for Washington to orchestrate
more political disruptions, which would either destabilize the
government further or force a crackdown that could then be cited in
seeking more Contra aid.
Putting the Sandinistas in this “inside-outside” vise had always been
part of the CIA strategy, but with a crumbling economy and more U.S.
money pouring into the opposition groups, the gambit was beginning to
work.
Yet, it was crucial to the plan that the CIA’s covert relationship
with Nicaragua’s internal opposition remain secret, not so much from the
Sandinistas, who had detailed intelligence about this thoroughly
penetrated operation, but from the American people. The U.S. public
would get outraged at Sandinista reprisals against these “independent”
groups only if the CIA’s hand were kept hidden.
A rich opportunity for the Reagan administration presented itself in
summer 1988 when a new spasm of Contra ambushes killed 17 Nicaraguans
and the anti-Sandinista internal opposition staged a violent
demonstration in the town of Nandaime, a protest that Sandinista police
dispersed with tear gas.
Reacting to the renewed violence, the Sandinistas closed down La Prensa and
the Catholic Church’s radio station – both prime vehicles for
anti-Sandinista propaganda. The Nicaraguan government also expelled U.S.
Ambassador Richard Melton and seven other U.S. Embassy personnel for
allegedly coordinating the disorders.
Major U.S. news outlets, which had accepted their role treating the
Sandinistas as “designated enemies” of the United States, roared in
outrage, and the U.S. Congress condemned the moves by a margin of 94-4
in the Senate and 385-18 in the House.
Melton then testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee first
in secret and then in public, struggling to hide the open secret in
Washington that Nicaragua’s internal opposition, like the Contras, was
getting covert help from the U.S. government.
When asked by a senator in public session about covert American
funding to the opposition, Melton dissembled awkwardly: “As to other
activities that might be conducted, that’s – they were discussed – that
would be discussed yesterday in the closed hearing.”
When pressed by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum on whether the embassy
provided “encouragement – financial or otherwise – of dissident
elements,” Melton responded stiffly: “The ambassador in any post is the
principal representative of the U.S. government. And in that capacity,
fulfills those functions.” He then declined to discuss “activities of an
intelligence nature” in open session.
On the Payroll
In other words, yes, the U.S. government was covertly organizing and
funding the activities of the supposedly “independent” internal
opposition in Nicaragua. And, according to more than a dozen sources
that I interviewed inside the Contra movement or close to U.S.
intelligence, the Reagan administration had funneled CIA money to
virtually every segment of the internal opposition, from the Catholic
Church to La Prensa to business and labor groups to political parties.
“We’ve always had the internal opposition on the CIA payroll,” one
U.S. government official said. The CIA’s budget line for Nicaraguan
political action – separate from Contra military operations – was about
$10 million a year, my sources said. I learned that the CIA had been
using the Church and Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo to funnel money into
Nicaragua.
Obando was a plodding but somewhat complex character. In the 1970s,
he had criticized the repression of the Somoza dictatorship and
expressed some sympathy for the young Sandinista revolutionaries who
were trying to bring social and economic changes to Nicaragua.
However, after the murder of El Salvador’s Archbishop Romero in 1980
and Pope John Paul II’s repudiation of “liberation theology,” Obando
shifted clumsily into the anti-Sandinista camp, attacking the “people’s
church” and accusing the Sandinistas of “godless communism.”
On May 25, 1985, he was rewarded when the Pope named him Cardinal for
Central America. Then, despite mounting evidence of Contra atrocities,
Obando traveled to the United States in January 1986 and threw his
support behind a renewal of military aid to the Contras.
All this made a lot more sense after factoring in that Obando had
essentially been put onto the CIA’s payroll. The CIA funding for
Nicaragua’s Catholic Church was originally unearthed in 1985 by the
congressional intelligence oversight committees, which then insisted
that the money be cut off to avoid compromising Obando further.
But the funding was simply transferred to another secret operation
headed by White House aide Oliver North. In fall 1985, North earmarked
$100,000 of his privately raised money to go to Obando for his
anti-Sandinista activities, I learned from my sources.
I was also told that the CIA’s support for Obando and the Catholic
hierarchy went through a maze of cut-outs in Europe, apparently to give
Obando deniability. But one well-placed Nicaraguan exile said he had
spoken with Obando about the money and the Cardinal had expressed fear
that his past receipt of CIA funding would come out.
What to Do?
Discovering this CIA funding of Nicaragua’s Catholic Church presented
professional problems for me at Newsweek, where my senior editors were
already making clear that they sympathized with the Reagan
administration’s muscular foreign policy and felt that the Iran-Contra
scandal had gone too far in undermining U.S. interests.
But what was the right thing for an American journalist to do with
this information? Here was a case in which the U.S. government was
misleading the American public by pretending that the Sandinistas were
cracking down on the Catholic Church and the internal opposition without
any justification. Plus, this U.S. propaganda was being used to make
the case in Congress for an expanded war in which thousands of
Nicaraguans were dying.
However, if Newsweek ran the story, it would put CIA assets,
including Cardinal Obando, in a dicey situation, possibly even
life-threatening. So, when I presented the information to my bureau
chief, Evan Thomas, I made no recommendation on whether we should
publish or not. I just laid out the facts as I had ascertained them. To
my surprise, Thomas was eager to go forward.
Newsweek contacted its Central America correspondent Joseph
Contreras, who outlined our questions to Obando’s aides and prepared a
list of questions to present to the Cardinal personally. However, when
Contreras went to Obando’s home in a posh suburb of Managua, the
Cardinal literally evaded the issue.
As Contreras later recounted in a cable back to Newsweek in the
United States, he was approaching the front gate when it suddenly swung
open and the Cardinal, sitting in the front seat of his burgundy Toyota
Land Cruiser, blew past.
As Contreras made eye contact and waved the letter, Obando’s driver
gunned the engine. Contreras jumped into his car and hastily followed.
Contreras guessed correctly that Obando had turned left at one
intersection and headed north toward Managua.
Contreras caught up to the Cardinal’s vehicle at the first
stop-light. The driver apparently spotted the reporter and, when the
light changed, sped away, veering from lane to lane. The Land Cruiser
again disappeared from view, but at the next intersection, Contreras
turned right and spotted the car pulled over, with its occupants
presumably hoping that Contreras had turned left.
Quickly, the Cardinal’s vehicle pulled onto the road and now sped
back toward Obando’s house. Contreras gave up the chase, fearing that
any further pursuit might appear to be harassment. Several days later,
having regained his composure, the Cardinal finally met with Contreras
and denied receiving any CIA money. But Contreras told me that Obando’s
denial was unconvincing.
Newsweek drafted a version of the story, making it appear as if we
weren’t sure of the facts about Obando and the money. When I saw a
“readback” of the article, I went into Thomas’s office and said that if
Newsweek didn’t trust my reporting, we shouldn’t run the story at all.
He said that wasn’t the case; it was just that the senior editors felt
more comfortable with a vaguely worded story.
Hot Water
We ended up in hot water with the Reagan administration and
right-wing media attack groups anyway. Accuracy in Media lambasted me,
in particular, for going with such a sensitive story without being sure
of the facts (which, of course, I was).
Thomas was summoned to the State Department where Assistant Secretary
of State Elliott Abrams heaped more criticism on me though not denying
the facts of our story. Newsweek also agreed, in the face of right-wing
pressure, to subject me and the article to an internal investigation,
which quietly reconfirmed the facts of the story.
Despite this corroboration, the incident damaged my relations with
senior Newsweek editors, particularly executive editor Maynard Parker
who saw himself as part of the New York/Washington foreign policy
establishment and was deeply hostile to the Iran-Contra scandal, which I
had helped expose.
As for Obando, the Sandinistas did nothing to punish him for his
collaboration with the CIA and he gradually evolved more into a figure
of reconciliation than confrontation. However, the hyper-secretive
Vatican has refused to open its archives for any serious research into
its relationship with the CIA and other Western intelligence services.
Whenever allegations do arise about the Catholic Church’s hierarchy
winking and nodding at the kinds of human rights atrocities that claimed
hundreds of thousands of lives in Latin America during the 1970s and
1980s, the Vatican PR department lashes out with sternly worded denials.
That practice is playing out again in the days after the election of
Pope Francis I. Rather than a serious and reflective assessment of the
actions (and inactions) of Cardinal Bergoglio, Cardinal Obando, Pope
John Paul II and other Church leaders during those dark days of torture
and murder, the Vatican simply denounces all allegations as “slander,”
“calumny” and politically motivated lies.
Investigative reporter Robert Parry broke many
of the Iran-Contra stories for The Associated Press and Newsweek in the
1980s. You can buy his new book, America’s Stolen Narrative, either in print here or as an e-book (from Amazon and barnesandnoble.com).
